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l CASE NO. 92-0563-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d)(Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court finding of no pretext stop was 
,fclearly erroneous11? 
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial 
court's ruling that Officer Beesley was justified in stopping 
the subject vehicle. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In considering an appeal from a circuit court motion to 
suppress, the Court of Appeals should give deference to the 
trial court's findings of fact, and be governed by a "clearly 
erroneous" standard. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881. 
Questions of law which flow from these factual findings are 
to reviewed under a "correctness11 standard. State v, Lopez, 831 
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 
213, 215 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATEMENT!? OF THE CASE 
The City concurs in appellant's Statement of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Officer Beesley, of Salt Lake City Police Department, 
testified on behalf of the city at the motion to suppress, and 
although he initially erred in his recollection of the case, he 
clarified upon refreshing his memory with the report, and was 
consistent in his testimony that the stop was precipitated by his 
belief that an apparent traffic violation. (T. 2, & 9) Officer 
Beesley testified that he observed the suspect vehicle pulling 
slowly across 100 South, and then stopping in his path, (T. 2, 5, 
& 9) 
The trial court found specifically, based on the testimony 
of Officer Beesley; 
[a] vehicle stopping in that position, as has been 
testified to by the officer, certainly would be far 
more than probable cause [to stop]. The officer 
would be derelict in his duty if he did not 
investigate to see what was wrong. (T. 24) 
It is clear from the testimony given by Officer Beesley, 
that he stopped the suspect vehicle based on his articulated 
suspicion that the driver was impeding traffic. (T. 2, 5, & 9) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court, having heard the evidence, ruled properly 
in finding that Officer Beesley did not stop the appellant under 
a pretext to search in an unconstitutional manner. 
The trial court was correct in finding that Officer 
Beesley's stop of the suspect vehicle on the basis of a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver was committing a 
traffic offense, such as impeding traffic, was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE CAN BE NO ISSUE OF A PRETEXTUAL STOP WHERE THE 
COURT DETERMINES THAT THE STOP WAS BASED ON THE 
OFFICER'S OBSERVATION OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION. 
Appellee concurs with the appellant's statement of the 
appropriate standard of review for questions of fact, The 
nclearly erroneous,f standard requires the ruling to be reversed 
if it is against the clear weight of the evidence or it is 
apparent that a mistake has been made. It does not mean that the 
appellate court considers and weighs the evidence de novo or that 
a ruling may be reversed merely because the reviewing court may 
have reached a different result. Great weight is still accorded 
the trial court and its decision is reversed only if there is 
inadequate evidentiary support or a mistake in the law. State v. 
Walker, 743 P*2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
As recently as March of last year, this Court has addressed 
the issue of pretext stops, stating that; 
the pretext doctrine applies in cases where the officer 
claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic 
violation, but where the court determines the stop was not 
made because of the traffic violation but rather due to an 
unconstitutional motivation and, therefore, the officer has 
deviated from the normal course of action expected of a 
reasonable officer. State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah App. 1992), citing State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
978. 
This court articulated the pretext doctrine further as; 
whether a "reasonable ... officer, in view of the totality 
of the circumstances confronting him or her, would have 
stopped" the vehicle for the traffic violation absent the 
unconstitutional motivation. Id. 
The trial court held in this case, that there was no 
pretext stop, because the officer acted as any reasonable 
officer with similar training and experience would have when 
faced with the same circumstances. (T. 24) 
The finding of facts by the trial court is clearly 
supported by sufficient evidence to sustain the denial of 
defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of pretext stop. 
II. REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
IN PROGRESS IS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A STOP. 
There are numerous reasons an officer might have for 
pulling a vehicle over, this court, again in Lopez, identified 
three situations where the officer is justified in stopping a 
vehicle: 
(1) When the officer observes the driver commit a traffic 
violation; (2) when the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a 
traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of 
alcohol ; and (3) when the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in more 
serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs, 
(citations omitted)(emphasis added) 
The issue presented by the immediate case pertains to the 
first situation, and it was addressed properly by the trial 
court as a question of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
See generally, State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1991). 
The trial court, after having heard the evidence, ruled that 
there was certainly probable cause. The officer's training and 
background allowed him to make the determination that a traffic 
violation was being committed, and thus make the stop. The 
trial court having stated specifically the basis for its finding 
that probable cause existed, this Court should review it under 
the "clearly erroneous" standard. The evidence in support of 
the reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause is 
sufficient to sustain the ruling of the lower court• 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the City requests that the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the 
basis of pretext stop be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of yieJpvva.yv 
1993. -f-
STEPHEN P. ZOLLINGER^ 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 8 ^ day of (^W^**VJI , 
1993, I caused to be delivered, four (4) true and correct copies 
of the Brief of Appellee to Deborah Kreeck Mendez, Esq., Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111• 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 






CASE NO. 92-0563-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal by defendant of the trial court's denial of the 
Motion to Suppress on the Grounds of Pre Text Stop, in a 
prosecution for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of 12.24.100 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City, in the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake 
Department, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Floyd 
H. Gowans, Judge, presiding. 
STEPHEN P. ZOLLINGER, #5838 
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 East, #125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 535-7767 
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
FEB 2 3 1993 
f
 Clerk of the Court 
ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
Salt Lake City Rev. Ordinances, Section 11.24.020 
A. It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this city if the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol content of .08 
percent or greater by weight as shown by a chemical 
test given within two hours after the alleged operation 
or physical control, or if the person is under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely driving a 
vehicle within the city... 
Amendment IV, United States Constitution 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularity describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Article I, Sections 7 and 14, Utah Constitution 
Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
